Since President Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in December, the landscape of Iranian influence in Syria has shifted dramatically. With the withdrawal of forces aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ahmed Al Sharaa, the newly established de facto leader, has made it clear that his administration will not permit Iran to reestablish its foothold in the country.
This development has garnered a positive response from the United States and other international observers; however, the situation remains precarious, and the potential for an Iranian resurgence cannot be dismissed. The instability that has followed the regime’s collapse has created various conditions under which Iranian influence could re-emerge.
One immediate concern is the internal security dynamics of Syria. Many members of the Alawite community, having historically supported Assad, now fear that the new government may target them in retaliation for the regime’s past actions. This apprehension has been exacerbated by increasing attacks from vigilante militants, which have escalated into more systematic assaults carried out by the new security forces. While some Alawite leaders express confidence in the government’s capacity to address these threats, others are growing restless and contemplating external assistance to bolster their security, including the potential for cooperation with Iran.
Reports indicate that some Alawite representatives have signaled to Israeli officials that they may be compelled to seek Iranian support if reprisal attacks continue. Additionally, similar violent incidents, including attacks on Shiite communities such as the attempted bombing of a major Shiite shrine in Damascus by Islamic State fighters, highlight the rising tensions and could catalyze an outbreak of anti-government sentiment.
Iran stands to reestablish its presence by leveraging this turmoil in two significant ways. First, Iranian forces might begin supplying arms to local insurgents who are currently engaging with security forces. Should these groups manage to solidify their standing, Iran could find it advantageous to reintroduce Shiite militias into Syria, particularly as attacks on Shiite populations are viewed as red lines that could provoke Iranian intervention.
Second, the continuing increase in insurgent activities has heightened overall instability. Iran has already resumed activities aimed at smuggling arms to Hezbollah via Syrian territories, taking advantage of the chaos that ensues from ongoing clashes and engagements. Interceptions of these operations may only be temporary solutions; escalating violence could strain governmental resources and hamper efforts to maintain control, thus weakening operations against Iranian influence.
In the northern regions, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have also faced intensifying battles against the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. These clashes raise alarms among U.S. officials, who caution that ongoing hostilities could create opportunities for a resurgence of ISIS. Meanwhile, unresolved negotiations regarding the integration of SDF-held territories with the new Syrian government further complicate the situation, as sporadic confrontations continue to erupt between the SDF and regime forces.
The interplay of these various security developments is creating a scenario where both the government’s focus on internal conflict and the looming threat of ISIS can serve to dilute efforts aimed at countering Iranian influence, potentially allowing Tehran to gradually rebuild its logistical channels to Hezbollah.
In addition to security-related challenges, economic pressures also pose a significant threat. Iranian officials have asserted that the new Syrian administration is expected to honor debts incurred by the Assad regime, estimated to be around $30 billion. The Syrian government disputes these claims, branding the debts associated with oppression as illegitimate and “odious.” However, historically, new governments have often been held to account for the debts of their predecessors, granting some legitimacy to Iran’s assertions, particularly if the U.S. does not actively contest these demands.
While Iran’s role in Syria is unlikely to recover to the magnitude it had under Assad, claims that its long-term ambitions in the region have been extinguished are likely overstated. Iran has solidified its presence within Syrian institutions and possesses substantial understanding of the country’s intricate political and military environment. Thus, even as the new U.S. administration contemplates strategies to counter Iran’s nuclear endeavors, it is critical to factor in the evolving dynamics within Syria, which could have implications for the broader regional balance.
