Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) has uncovered the presence of numerous foreign-made machines at Uralvagonzavod, recognized as Russia’s largest state-owned manufacturer of tanks and armored vehicles. This revelation was shared on the agency’s dedicated War and Sanctions portal, emphasizing the factory’s reliance on imported advanced technology, particularly computer numerical control (CNC) machines, which are crucial for precision cutting and molding in the production of complex mechanical parts.
Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of GUR, indicated that much of the high-tech equipment currently in use at the plant was procured during a significant modernization of Russia’s defense sector that commenced in 2007, predating the large-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Despite facing international sanctions that have persisted through three years of conflict, Uralvagonzavod has notably increased its output, including plans for a new tank engine production line slated for launch in 2024, which will utilize European CNC machines. The monitoring of these shipments reveals that they continue to reach Russian facilities via third-party countries, although these acquisitions have become increasingly complicated, expensive, and time-consuming due to the existing restrictions.
The updated monitoring database from Kyiv now catalogs nearly 1,400 foreign machines across 169 Russian defense enterprises. Each entry is meticulously recorded with documents, photographs, and videos, with about one-third of the entries including serial numbers. This information is aimed at helping manufacturers trace their equipment back to Russia in an effort to disrupt supply chains for critical spare parts, fluids, or software necessary for maintaining operation.
GUR has stressed the importance of coordinated international diplomatic efforts to mitigate the aggressor’s capacity to sustain its military actions. They advocate for the exchange of information and stringent measures to thwart any attempts at sanction evasion on a global scale, asserting that thorough investigations and enhanced accountability for those breaching restrictions are essential to curtailing the supply channels of military technology.
Highlighting the continued reliance on foreign components in Russian armaments, the War and Sanctions portal noted instances such as the June revelation of a Russian V2U loitering munition used in a recent assault, which was found to contain foreign elements, including an NVIDIA Jetson Orin, Intel AC 8265, and a Sony imaging sensor. This followed prior disclosures regarding a captured S8000 Banderol cruise missile that incorporated parts sourced from Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Furthermore, an Indian-made component was identified within multiple Russian weapon systems, illustrating the ongoing complexity of international supply networks at play in the conflict.
